






A SURVEY OF SELECTED


















This paper presents a critique of several selected studies in
the areas of officer retention and grade structure. These studies
are investigated to determine what methods of approach and analytic
techniques were employed in accomplishing the objectives of the study
group. An assessment is made of the degree of success or failure
realized by each study. In discussing officer grade structure studies,
this paper also presents the factors which are necessary to create
an "optimal" grade structure, and reviews the current grade structures
and legal constraints which act upon these structures.
This research was supported in part by the Office of Naval
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This paper presents a critical review of selected studies in the
areas of officer retention and officer grade structure.
The first area of investigation, the retention problem, has been the
subject of numerous studies on many levels, and has received increased
attention with increasing pressures for conversion of the armed forces to
an all-volunteer organization.
The second area of investigation in this paper is the officer grade
structure. The present grade structures have been established under
ceiling constraints set by the Congress and further amended by the service
secretaries. However, during periods of severe fluctuations in the total
size of the armed forces, the individual services have considerable
latitude in adjusting their grade structures. A structure which is optimal
for a total force of a certain size may be far from optimal when the
total force is greatly expanded or reduced. Further, no clear cut criterion
for determining the "optimal" grade structure has been established nor is
it clear that any such criterion exists.
In this paper, the method of review for these selected studies
involves three basic steps:
1) Determine the objectives of the study.
2) Describe the techniques/methods of approach used in the study.
3) Determine the degree of success or failure of the study.
Each study is analyzed in light of its specific objectives, since a
knowledge of these objectives contributes to an understanding of why a
particular method of approach was used in one study and not in another.
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It is possible in some cases to judge the degree of success or failure
realized by the study. The criterion for judging this success is in
general the degree to which the results and/or recommendations of the
study have been incorporated into present procedures for improving officer
retention or modifying the existing grade structure. Another important
criterion is whether or not the study gives insight into the structure of
the officer personnel system, whether or not it pin-points the important
variables, and whether or not it leads to the design of new or better
systems. This last point is important if a given study is to do more than
make marginal changes to the current system.
The following major studies have been chosen as subjects for this
review:
1) Institute of Naval Studies, Study No. 13, Manpower Considerations
Applicable to the Navy in the 1970-1980 Time Period , Annex B, Officer
Survey, 1965.
2) Institute of Naval Studies Research Contribution #17, Predicting
Effectiveness of Incentive Programs for Various Groups of Naval Officers
,
by Charles M. Harsh, 31 March 1966.
3) Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Report of the Secretary of
the Navy's Task Force on Navy/Marine Corps Personnel Retention
,
1966.
4) The Franklin Institute Research Laboratory, Career Motivation of
Army Personnel - Junior Officer Duties
,
30 September 1968.
5) Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel, Officer Grade Structure Study
,
1969.
II. OFFICER RETENTION STUDIES
Studies in this field concentrate on factors (mostly behavioral)
which affect the retention of officers, and are intended to support man-
power management programs by predicting retention rates. In some cases,
attempts have been made to estimate the cost and effectiveness of proposed
programs for improving retention.
As an example of the type of results obtained through officer
retention studies, consider one finding of the Institute on Naval Studies
Study 13, Navy Manpower Considerations, 1970-1980 . Results of the officer
survey section of this study indicate that the career intentions of a
young (age 25-27) , married naval officer are generally more favorable
than those of an unmarried officer of the same age. However, these
intentions are influenced by the officers' wives' dissatisfaction. The
survey also determined that wives who want their husbands to leave the
Navy are much less concerned about income than about poor housing
facilities, medical care, frequent moves, and prolonged separations. These
results suggest a need for the Navy to concentrate its efforts toward
improving housing and medical attention, reducing the number of moves a
family must make, and easing the burden imposed by separation. Recent
actions indicate that increased attention is being directed toward these
areas by Navy authorities.
A. INSTITUTE OF NAVAL STUDIES, STUDY 13, NAVY MANPOWER CONSIDERATIONS ,
1970-1980
. [Reference 1]
This study was conducted in 1965-1966 as a follow-on to the Institute
of Naval Studies "Manning the Future Navy," Study 11, 1964. The modeling
techniques and methods of quantifying decision data demonstrate the
value of the analytic approach to studies in the field of personnel-
related research.
The primary objectives of the study were: [Ref. 1]
"(1) To study factors of personal characteristics, background
and Navy experience which might be related to the retainability of
officers
.
(2) To estimate the effectiveness of a variety of incentive
changes as a means of encouraging longer active duty careers."
The study was exploratory, and was intended to give insight into
the relevant factors which could be used by the Chief of Naval
Operations in policies relating to selection, training, utilization,
and retention of officers.
'The study relied heavily on the responses to questionnaires.
These responses were used to assess relationships between an officer's
service intentions and a variety of factors, such as family background,
education, occupational and income aspirations, family pressures,
reasons for entering the Navy, types of duty, satisfying and frustrating
experiences, career objectives, comparisons of Navy and civilian life,
and statements as to how present service plans would be altered by
the introduction of various incentive changes. The survey group con-
sisted of a stratified random sample of Navy officers (from Ensign to
Captain inclusive) , with membership composed of 10% of all Unrestricted
Line Officers and 20% of all Staff Corps and Restricted Duty Officers.
Those completing questionnaires remained anonymous, and a total of
9350 questionnaires were returned from an initial mailing of 9980.
It was assumed that this constituted a representative sample of the
active duty officer population.
The best retention^ criterion for officers was—a&aumad to be the
officer's stated career intention, and it is upon this critical
assumption that_the applicability of the results of this survey rests.
In any case, it was felt that an officer's response to various proposed
incentives could give a valid estimate of the relative effectiveness
of different incentive programs. Using this retention criterion, the
analysis was mainly used to discover what factors differentiate among
groups whose career intentions are undecided, those who intend to
leave the Navy as soon as possible, those who intend to retire after
20 years of service, and those who intend to remain in the service as
long as possible.
The results of the survey were analyzed using multiple regression
techniques. A total of 284 primary variables and 261 derived variables
were established and investigated, then trivariate analyses were com-
puted for about 150 of the many possible combinations of three variables
at a time. Summary relationships between pairs of variables were
generally felt to be deceptive because of the confounding effects of
other factors, such as age, family, and career motives, so these
relationships were not used.
In this study a total of 13 specific retention incentives were intro-
duced and investigated. Each incentive was introduced by asking the
officer in his response to indicate how this particular incentive would
influence his present career intentions. His answer was indicated by
checking one of the following responses:
a. Would greatly strengthen my desire to pursue a long career in
the Navy.
b. Quite favorably, I would continue active duty several years longer
than now intended.
c. Favorably; without changing my present intentions.
d. No effect on my service intentions or Navy attitides.
e. Would make a Navy career somewhat less desirable for me.
The study group estimated that the value of the incentive was indicated
by the percentage of officers choosing either of the first two responses.
The attractiveness of the 13 incentives was then measured as they
affected different career intentions ("Leave Soon," "Undecided," and
"Retire at 20 years")
,
grouping based on rank (which was highly correlated
with age), and grouping by designator (Unrestricted Line, Aviators, Supply
and Civil Engineer Corps, Medical and Dental Corps, etc.). Attractiveness
was also measured as it appealed to other factors of the officer population
such as source of commission, family status, spouse's attitudes, income
standards, and Navy experiences.
Results of questions concerning these incentives were displayed in
the form of graphs and tables, and significance tests between groups were
made at the 0.01 level or better in order to check whether the observed
differences between groups are likely to be real, or can be attributed to
chance
. Trivariate analysis was used in the construction of these dis-
plays. For example, analysis of an officer's rank and career intentions
was conducted versus attraction of incentives. Primary attention was
focused on officers whose career intentions were "Undecided" and who were
in age group 25-27, as this group of officers obviously held the most
promise as a source of retention candidates.
Based on the responses to the officer survey questionnaire, it was
apparent that the "Undecided" officer and the officer with the intention
to "Retire at 20 years" perceive many of the same objectives and rewards
of Navy life, while the "Leave Soon" group generally have objectives which
are not suited to Navy life. In response to the 13 incentives, none of
the 13 held great attraction to the "Leave Soon" group, while the "Undecided"
and "Retire at 20 years" groups were in substantial agreement in their
responses to almost all of the incentives. The implication was that while
an incentive which appeals to the "Undecided" officer will offer little
attraction to the "Leave Soon" officer, neither will that incentive cause
any career motivated officer to decide to leave the Navy.
In evaluating the responses to this portion of the INS Study, it
should be borne in mind that the percentage of favorable replies to an
incentive should not be judged as the indicator of the absolute worth of
that incentive. In light of previous and subsequent studies of the same
nature, it would appear that at best the percentages give a relative
standing of the impact of each of the suggested incentives.
A survey method of this size is obviously an expensive undertaking
(the cost of this survey was approximately $200,000), but an analysis
such as this requires large sample sizes to ensure that each cell in the
analysis contains a large enough sample to minimize the effect of sampling
errors. In the same vein, it was felt that cell frequencies would be too
small to trust when investigating multivariate relationships of four or
more variables simultaneously, and thus trivariate relationships were
studied almost exclusively.
One method of assessing the success of this study is to note that
many of the results were used by the Secretary of the Navy's Task. Force
on Navy /Marine Corps Personnel Retention in 1966. The outcome of the Task
Force recommendations can readily be seen from the Secretary of the Navy's
specific action taken on each recommendation. Thus, some results of the
INS Study 13 were transformed from survey responses into implemented
Navy-wide policies and procedures in a rather short period of time.
Referring to the previous example on the attractiveness of certain of the
13 incentives, the obvious preference for items involving an increase in
pay/compensation led to the Task Force's submission of 14 specific
recommendations on improvement in the area of pay and compensation; the
Secretary of the Navy approved 12 of these 14 recommendations.
However, it must be kept in mind that the study was exploratory
and concluded by recommending additional study programs to:
1. Determine personal characteristics and experiences related to
effectiveness
,
2. Determine combinations of incentives which would best retain
effective officers in certain categories, and
3. Develop officer feedback measures and other assignment criteria
to increase officer satisfaction as well as Navy effectiveness.
It should be noted also that the information presented by this study
might be used to give a fairly accurate estimate of the retainability of
officers, but it does not show the best means of retaining those officers
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who may be the most effective or most needed by the Navy. Therefore, the
insights gained from this study should be carefully reviewed against
better criteria of officer desirability when attempting to transform these
insights into policy programs designed to retain the most effective officers,
or officers possessing a particularly desirable skill.
A final point is that the results of this study rely for accuracy
on the survey response. The pitfalls of this approach are well known, and
an implicit assumption the modeller must make is that if the various
incentive policies suggested in the questionnaire were put into practice,
then the officer responding would in fact behave in a way consistent with
his hypothetical responses.
B. INSTITUTE OF NAVAL STUDIES RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION #17, PREDICTING
EFFECTIVENESS OF INCENTIVE PROGRAMS FOR VARIOUS GROUPS OF NAVAL
OFFICERS
,
by CHARLES M. HARSH. [Reference 2]
This study is an extension of the analysis of data gathered in the
officer survey portion of INS Study 13, Navy Manpower Considerations
,
1970-1980. The study develops a method for estimating the effectiveness
of various officer incentive programs, and attempts to assign a relative
cost to several alternative combinations of incentives.
The objectives of the research contribution were to: [Ref. 2]
"(1) Develop a method for estimating effects of incentive programs,
making allowance for continuance probabilities for officers with different
service intentions.
(2) Compare several combinations of incentives with regard to their
probable effectiveness in retaining officers of certain age and designator
groups.
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(3) Determine the relationships between incentive appeal and Navy
promotional criteria for officer effectiveness.
(4) Examine the relative appeal of incentives for officers with
various backgrounds, career objectives, and Navy experience."
The analysis here relied on the data base obtained in response
to the officer survey portion of INS Study 13. Additional computer runs
subsequent to the release of Study 13 provided the data for investigating
the appeal of incentive factors to career objectives. As in Study 13,
the primary method of evaluating the effectiveness of combinations of
incentives was trivariate analysis.
This study recognized that some of the results of Study 13 may have
been distorted by the use of percentages of members in each group
responding to incentives, and attempted to present a clearer picture by
using actual numbers of officers who indicated they would extend service
in response to an incentive. Also, in attempting to establish actual
numbers of officers who would extend service, and place some relative
cost on the various incentives, the technique of "Continuance Prediction"
was developed.
Continuance Prediction is simply an assumption of stationarity in
the behavior of different age-groups of the officer population; i.e.,
different groups are assumed to behave in a similar manner through time.
The simplified equation for continuance prediction is:
L P, + U P +MP + S =N^
n
a 1 a u am a a+1
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where L represents the number of officers in age group a whose
a
stated intention is to "Leave Soon," U is the number of officers in
a
age group a whose intentions are "Undecided," M is the number of
a
officers intending to serve for 6 to 16 years, S is the number who
a
intend to serve for 20 years or longer, and N is the number of
officers continuing into the next age group a+1 . It is desired to
determine the continuance proportions P. ; i = l,u,m,s, assumed
constant from age group to age group (i.e. independent of a) to
determine how many officers will continue into the next higher age
group. The subscripts 1, u, m, s refer to leave soon, undecided,
serve 6-16 years, serve 20 years or more respectively. It is assumed
that P =1, i.e., all officers intending to serve for 20 years or
more would continue to the next age group.
To solve for the most likely values of P. , P , and P , threeJ 1 u m
equations were written for the three age groups (20-27, 28-33, and
34-40), using values of L, U, M, and S from the officer survey
sample group (N had been shown to be fairly constant for the previous
eight years). The three equations were solved simultaneously yielding
the continuance proportions of P. = .044, P = .694, and P = .756 .r r 1 u m
These proportions agree with ones intuition of what the officers in
these categories might be expected to do.
On page 6 of Ref 2 the author claims "phenomenal" agreement when
estimated N agree exactly with the actual N when calculated from the
equations. Since he is determining an identity by substituting back
into the equations he has just solved, any disagreement could be caused
only by arithmetic errors. No independent test of the stationarity
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assumption is given, and its validity is open to serious question. It
does not seem realistic to think that, for example P would be
u
independent of the age group, that the same proportion (.694 in the
report) of undecided in age group (20-27) and (34-40) would continue
to the next age group. In fact, it is not clear how the study accounts
for the last age group. The P's determined are "average" continuance
proportions for all age groups.
Using the original survey information on attractiveness of incen-
tives to officer groups with different intentions, and having estimated
the probable continuance of officers with different service intentions,
the study then developed a method for estimating the probable gain in
service extensions which would result from several of the different
incentive combinations. This expected number of extensions within each
designator and age group can be estimated by the equation:
(1 - P^E. + (1 - P )E + (1 - P )E = G ,.
1 la u ua m ma a+1
where E, is the number of officers whose intentions are "Leave
la
Soon" who say they would extend service in response to this particular
combination of incentives. E and E have similar interpretations
ua ma
for the "Undecided" and "Intend to serve 6~16 years" categories in age




and P are interpreted as before. Therefore, the quantity
(1 - P-,)E represents an additional number of officers in age group
-L J. 3.
a with intentions "Leave Soon" who now will extend service in response
to the particular incentive.
This estimation technique was used for many combinations of
incentives, age groups and designators. The results, in tabular form,
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show the estimated number of officers in each designator and age group
who would be expected to extend service in response to a particular
combination of incentives (e.g. Specialization and Better Housing, or
Civil Service Equivalent). With these estimated numbers, it is now
possible to determine the cost of a particular choice of incentives.
The study found that in some cases, two sets of incentives which would
expect to attract about the same number of officers may result in costs
which are two or three times greater for one set of incentives as compared
to the other. This type of analysis represents a significant step in
the introduction of cost-effectiveness analysis into the field of retention,
and also provides a means for introducing different incentive programs
while keeping in mind both Navy requirements and budget constraints.
Hopefully, refinements of this technique will permit the Navy to select
and introduce (at a reasonable cost) that combination of incentives which
will attract officers from a desired category without also retaining too
many officers in categories which are less desirable.
In summary, this study has attempted to develop techniques for
estimating continuance probabilities, and to determine the effects of
several incentive programs on different age and designator groups. Cost-
effectiveness analysis was introduced as an aid in comparing alternate
incentive programs. No single incentive will accomplish each particular
aim of the Navy, but the study does suggest a method for developing trade-
offs between objectives of the Navy and the costs involved in introducing
incentives. Although some false conclusions are drawn from testing the
model assumptions (especially stationarity) , the unsophisticated aspects
of the model are one of its advantages.
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C. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY'S TASK FORCE ON NAVY/MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL RETENTION .
[Reference 3]
This Task Force was established by the Secretary of the Navy in
early 1965 with the purpose of conducting a comprehensive review and
analysis of the factors affecting retention of Navy /Marine Corps officers
and enlisted personnel. The results of the Task Force were presented to
the Secretary of the Navy in the form of a series of recommendations
designed to improve retention. These recommendations were acted on by
the Secretary in early 1966 when each was individually accepted, rejected,
or deferred for further study.
The mission of the Task Force was: [Ref. 3]
"(1) To identify and examine the major factors bearing on retention
of high quality officer and enlisted personnel.
(2) To develop a plan for attacking these retention problems which
was to include:
a. specific recommendations
b. a program to implement the recommendations;
and
c. identification of the specific Government officials or
agencies who are presently empowered to implement such actions."
The scope of the study was extremely broad, to the extent that anything
which would improve the naval service could be considered as being a
factor affecting retention and as such was a bona fide area of interest
of the Task Force study.
Major information sources for the study consisted of:
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1. Fact finding by the Task Force members, including major contri-
butions from the Bureau of Naval Personnel and Headquarters, Marine Corps.
2. Letters which were solicited from Navy/Marine Corps personnel,
their wives, and other interested persons.
3. Naval Personnel Survey 64-1.
4. Various Institute of Naval Studies efforts (including Study 13,
Navy Manpower Considerations
, 19 70-1980, which has been reviewed in this
paper) .
5. A National Opinion Survey conducted by Louis B. Harris and
Associates.
6. Symposia conducted by the Task Force members meeting with Navy/
Marine Corps personnel and their wives in Norfolk, San Diego, and Quantico.
7. Other bureaus and offices within the Navy Department.
8. All major fleet and type commanders.
In addition, many special studies on more specific aspects of the retention
problem were either conducted especially for the Task Force, or made
available to the members of the Task Force.
Two mathematical models were used to assist in the Task Force effort
to relate the available data and statistics to measures of cost and
effectiveness, and the trade-off between these measures. The first of
the models was the MARCIA (Mathematical Analysis of Requirements for
Career Information Appraisal) model, developed by the Bureau of Naval
Personnel, while the second model was one developed by the Task Force
using the concept of productivity as a measure of effectiveness,
measuring costs in terms of productivity under various programs with
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different retention levels.
The first model, MARCIA, was designed to determine steady-state
impacts of changing promotion rates, career ratios, continuance rates,
and billet structure. The MARCIA model is a linear programming model
which varies the input parameters (retention rates, length of obligated
service, and pay grade structure), to produce an output consisting of a
rating structure by pay grade and length of service to sustain required
billets. Along with this rating structure profile, the model indicates
associated costs and the values of effectiveness derived (effectiveness
measures were developed by the Task Force based primarily on pay grade,
rating, time in pay grade, and promotion factors). The model produced
an "optimal solution" which maximizes the effectiveness to cost ratio.
The MARCIA model was developed to deal only with investigations of enlisted
personnel retention, and therefore will be discussed no further in this
paper. Appendix K of Ref. 3, describes the model in detail.
The second model, the Cost-per-Productive-Man-Year Model, was also
developed primarily for use in studying enlisted retention. Considerable
effort was expended attempting to define and adequately quantify
"productivity." This was done by building a data source from the Navy's
3M Aircraft Maintenance System, determining what productive work was
accomplished by men of different grade, different ratings, and different
amounts of experience in grade and rating. This information was trans-
formed into "utilization factors" for development of productivity details
which then became a part of the Cost per Productive Man Year to determine
the cost of different Navy careers as a function of continuance of the
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enlisted member. The model investigated inter-relationships among cost,
production, and force size, and conducted comparative cost analyses for
alternative manpower resource levels and alternative retention proposals,
such as sea pay for officers. The model and its computer program are
further described in Appendix J of Ref . 3.
The study attempted to back up each recommendation with mathematical
analysis, but this was not possible in all cases because of the inability
to quantify all the factors bearing on retention. In these cases, Task
Force members attempted to support their findings with logic and judgement.
The study effort was of such overall magnitude that retention considerations
were broken down into such subcategories as personnel management, improve-
ment, officer promotion, opportunities, officer distribution, education
and training, living conditions afloat and ashore, the image of the Navy/
Marine Corps, medical care, and pay and fringe benefits. Each subcategory
was analyzed and resulted in recommendations pertinent to that field of
interest. It is not possible for this paper to present all of the tech-
niques employed by the Task Force; however, some of the highlights are
presented.
Officer retention was viewed from two aspects; the quantitative
problem, and the qualitative problem. In the quantitative area, the Task
Force studied stated requirements versus numbers of officers available
and revealed serious imbalances in several communities at different
ranks. The study delved deeper and discovered that even in cases where
there does not appear to be a quantitative problem, some discrepancies
exist. The Medical Corps presents such a problem, where specialization
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prevents officers of the same rank from being interchangeable. The Task
Force accepted the existing billet structure as being a valid representa-
tion of the actual needs of the Navy, but pointed out that this structure
should be investigated further to determine if it is indeed valid. In
investigating the quantitative problems the Task Force did no detailed
analysis of specific aspects of the problem; it simply presented the
statistics revealing the number of billets and the number of officers
presently available in each grade and branch of the service, and then
drew attention to those areas where chronic imbalances existed.
Problems of a qualitative nature were also found to exist. Select-
ivity for promotion has been considerably reduced for middle grade officers,
and has yielded some undesirable effects. In addition, technological
advancements indicate that a greater need currently exists to maintain a
high quality officer community by improving management in the fields of
career planning, education, and use of officer abilities.
In the area of officer promotion opportunities, the Task Force
recommended proposals to streamline the promotion procedure, permitting
accelerated promotions for more promising officers, and providing for
greater authority to selectively not continue some senior officers. The
most far reaching of the recommendations was the call for adoption of a
Distribution Zone Promotion Plan. This plan was developed through
extensive data collection and analysis of previous promotion patterns,
and was then presented in the form of recommended selection and attrition
rates based on years of completed commissioned service for different
officer communities C±.e. , Unrestricted Line, Supply Corps, Civil Engineer
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Corps, etc.)- The major objective of this and other recommendations on
promotion opportunities was to increase retention and pride in the Navy
officer corps by demonstrating recognition of superior performance through
accelerated promotion and assignment to key billets. Although the motiva-
tion for Distribution Zone Promotion and other promotion recommendations
was to improve retention through rewarding superior performance, no
analysis was conducted to determine exactly what effect these actions
would have in terms of the quantity and quality of officers retained.
Personnel surveys conducted in 1964 and 1965 provided some of the
data and pointed the direction to some of the Task Force recommendations
in the areas of officer distribution, training, education, living conditions,
image, medical care, and pay and fringe benefits. Wherever possible, the
Task Force attempted to assign costs to the recommendations presented. In
some areas (promotion, officer distribution and management, and image),
the costs of changes were minimal. However, sizable funding would be
required to implement recommended changes in officer education and training,
living conditions, medical care, and pay. Preparation of cost data
constituted some of the most concrete analysis undertakings of the study.
Another analytical contribution to the study was the set of statistical
studies developed for Navy enlisted personnel, Navy officers, and Marine
Corps officer and enlisted personnel. These studies provided an overview
of the statistical picture of these groups. This includes data on grade
strength, promotion and procurement experiences, retention experiences,
and comparisons of present structures with the "ideal" structures as
envisioned by law and billets as presently established. Conclusions have
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been drawn from certain of these statistical studies in the sub -categories
of the overall Task Force study.
The Task Force established a Technical Support Group to develop
analytical techniques for testing and refining of Task Force recommendations
Most of the techniques developed, such as continuance rate models, were
applied to enlisted retention considerations. However, considerable
effort was also expended in the development of the cost and effectiveness
models mentioned above. Additionally, many retention factors were
analyzed as problems of supply and demand.
The analytical efforts of this study did not end with the publishing
of the final report and dissolution of the Task Force. In fact, they
were still expanding, and the study pointed out where further work was to
be done. Problems encountered in the study indicated that further studies
were needed in such areas as:
(1) Determination of manpower requirements and inventories, along
with points of imbalance between the two.
(2) Methods of measurement and control of the supply of personnel
entering or continuing in the system.
(3) Development and use of manpower management information systems.
(4) Development of information sources.
In accomplishing its mission, the Task Force's recommendations by and
large received considerable approval from the Secretary of the Navy. Most
of the recommendations which were not approved were either disapproved
because of budget limitations or were deferred pending further study. To
the extent that implementation of recommendations represents success of
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this Task Force, it must be considered that the study was highly success-
ful. However, to the extent that the retention problem has been solved
or eased in the intervening five years, it must be considered that the
study was not nearly so successful, especially in solving the quantitative
aspects of the retention problem.
D. THE FRANKLIN INSTITUTE RESEARCH LABORATORIES, CAREER MOTIVATION OF
ARMY PERSONNEL - JUNIOR OFFICER DUTIES . [Reference 4]
This study was prepared for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel,
Department of the Army and was published as a two volume report on 30
September 1968. The study attempted to identify factors which have an
influence on Army officer career decisions. The study objectives were
to: [Ref. 4]
"(1) Determine the relationship between extrinsic (environmental)
factors such as pay, duty assignments, and fringe benefits, and intrinsic
factors such as pride, challenge, satisfaction, and independence.
(2) Determine the relationship between extrinsic and intrinsic
factors and junior officer retention.
(.3) Specify what changes to the extrinsic factors are most likely
to influence the intrinsic factors, and, thereby, improve junior officer
retention."
The subjects selected for this study were Army company grade officers
with more than six months but less than five years of active commissioned
service. Emphasis was placed on duty assingments, the content of these
duties, and career management.
A total of 4532 officers, stationed both overseas and in the United
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States, took part in this study. This officer sample group represented a
stratified two stage selection with primary stratification across branches
(i.e., Infantry, Artillery, Engineer, Chemical, etc.) and supplementary
stratification across ranks (Captain, First Lieutenant, Second Lieutenant).
Data was collected through group-administered questionnaires in the United
States, and a mailed survey for the overseas subjects. All subjects
remained anonymous
.
Between 312 and 389 separate responses were obtained from each officer,
depending on his service status and career convictions. Space was provided
for written comments at the end of the questionnaire and more than one-
third of the subjects submitted some comments. Additionally, informal
discussions were held by interviewers with participants in the United
States. These discussions, which were not mandatory for the participants,
were used to further investigate the attitudes and reactions of the
officers. A pilot interview program was used to remove some ambiguity
and streamline questionnaire actually administered to the participants
of the main study. In addition, a validation sample of 113 officers who
had been separated from the Army in the past two years was questioned.
The purpose of this validation was to gain a different perspective of
retention and perhaps point out possible contradictions or biases in
the main study findings.
The questionnaire and study effort were organized to permit analysis
on two separate but concurrent levels; quantitative and qualitative.
The objective of this approach was to solicit recommendations or comments
from the participants on matters about which they felt strongly. The
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comments were reviewed and analyzed qualitatively without the use of any
statistical techniques; the study designers simply wanted to discover
areas which may not have been covered by the questionnaire, to highlight
areas where further investigation might be justified, and to provide some
means of corroborating the findings of the quantitative analysis.
In the first question each participant classified himself as "staying,"
"leaving," or "undecided, " with various degrees of inclination toward one
of these categories. The officer's declared service intention, based on
the reply to this question, was used as the dependent variable in investi-
gating the intrinsic, extrinsic, and duty factors which affected him.
The principal analytic techniques used were canonical analysis .
principal component analysis
,
and the more co^y^nJt,ipjiajL_s^e^wJ.s^_j:e^jessl^n
analysis. The canonical correlation analysis [Refs. 9 and 12] was
conducted on correlation matri ces
_ ofL_the_ extrinsic, intrinsic, and duty
variables using data from the three groups of officers. Hypothesis
testing indicated that interclass dependence does exist between these
variables, but the correlations between the variables were so low and
sensitiveto extreme values that canonical variates could not be used in
a predictive sense. Because of this, it was felt that the Hotelling
principal components technique [Ref. 8] would describe the dependencies
of the three types of variables (intrinsic, extrinsic, and duty) in a
more useful manner.
The Hotelling principal components analysis was carried out on the
correlation matrices of the extrinsic and intrinsic items and computed
from the three groups ("staying," "leaving," and "undecided"). A program
23
from the BIOMED Program Package [Ref. 11] was used in this analysis.
First principal components were used to determine the six extrinsic
factors of lowest and highest weights for each officer group. (As an
example, the "leaving" group seemed to place a higher value on material
success, such as promotion, housing, and pay, than did the "staying"
group).
The second principal components are in essence comparisons of the
extrinsic and intrinsic scores of the officers, while third principal
components consist of comparisons of certain favorable extrinsic
Army benefits and some of the less favorable aspects of Army life.
The study group also used stepwise regression models [Ref. 13]
^-" —
-^f^ *^\
to investigate the effects of intrinsic, extrinsic, and overview
factors on retention. The output of these three models was used as
input to another regression model designed to analyze more closely how
the Army might influence the "undecided" officer.
Another undertaking of the study was the effort to establish
relationships between certain socio-economic and service status factors.
The effect of each of these factors on retention was measured using the
non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Chi-square tests [Ref. 14]. Some
of these socio-economic factors included source of commission, rank,
branch, racial group, father's occupation, and education level attained.
* (Those not listed specifically in intrinsic or extrinsic factors or
the list of duties).
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The result of all the preceding analysis was the development
of a Retention Mode l, by integration of the previous modeling
steps. The purpose of this model was to investigate changes in
retention resulting from changes in those factors which are control-
lable. This model led to a series of specific analyses of the sig-
nificant variables discovered. The study revealed those intrinsic
factors considered most important (i.e., sense of achievement,
sense of challenge, responsibility, independence) and also determined \
that these intrinsic needs are primarily satisfied by job content
of duty assignments, and not by the extrinsic factors such as pay,
housing, and retirement.
Having had some success in identifying those factors which
have a significant effect on retention, the question of what effects
various proposed Army actions would have on retention was studied
next. A Resource Allocation Model was developed to predict retention
and cost effects of new programs or policies. This model attempted
to determine how many officers might be retained, and the distribution
of these officers by rank, branch, marital status, and several other
profile items.
The model analyzed the results of the study questionnaire section on
"The effects of proposed changes in extrinsic factors on career decisions.
The effect of each of the 48 proposed changes was measured and tabulated
in the form of a total of officers retained by this change. However, it
was realized that many of the responses to the proposed changes reflected
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more wishful thinking than carefully weighed consideration on the part of
the respondents and therefore the choices of proposed changes were
weighed not so much on their absolute effects as they were for their
relative magnitude.
Based on the questionnaire answers, the Resource Allocation Model
proceeded iteratively to accept individuals into the "Staying" group
of officers. The analysis used a weighted probability function to help
determine the number of officers who would be expected to join the
"Staying" group as the result of some extrinsic factor, considering
different probabilities of this actually happening depending on whether
the officer had previously been considered "Leaving" or "Undecided."
This weighted probability function was constructed to measure the
number of officers who would actually remain in the service, given the
number of officers indicating each of the different career intentions.
Recall that each officer was asked to indicate his service intention and
his answer carried a numerical weight ranging from 1 ("I definitely intend
to leave active duty as soon as possible") up to 7 ("I definitely intend
to make a career in the Army"). Next, probability values were assigned to
the percentage of officers in each response category who would actually
remain in the Array. For example, the probability of staying in the Army,
given a "1" or "2" response, was assumed to be negligible (1 percent),
but this probability was expected to increase with increasing responses
"3" through "6", and finally was assumed to be not less than 85 percent
and not more than 95 percent, given a "7" response. Based on these
assumptions, maximum and minimum numbers of officers expected to stay in
the Army were computed for the extrinsic factors. In addition, techniques
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were introduced to reduce the "wish-list" effect on each of the officer's
responses.
One drawback of this analysis was that of ten extrinsic
factors considered most important by the respondents, five of them,
including the top three, were related to duties, which was the most dif-
ficult area to deal with from the resource allocation point of view. As
an example, the factor which had the greatest response was "Utilized
officers' assignment-preference statement to a greater extent in actual
assignment to duties." Because of the rather general nature of this and
other duties-related responses, most of the model's analyses were run
while excluding duties-related items. Thereafter, the factors investi-
gated most thoroughly primarily concerned education and allowances.
The factors which seemed most promising were then analyzed in packages
of three at a time and tabulated by profile groups to assess their effects
on numbers of officers retained as a result of the incentive package.
Further methods were introduced to reduce "wish list" effect which was
apparently inflating some of the response figures.
The result of analysis using this model was a fairly consistent
indication of areas of major interest to retention improvement. Implemen-
tation of programs to alleviate problems in any and all of these areas
was predicted to increase junior officer retention from the present 18%
to rates in the range of 24-40%, depending on which and how many of the
factors were implemented as programs or policy changes.
Returning to the validation study conducted using responses of
officers recently separated from the Army, it was determined that the
validation study was in close agreement with results obtained through
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the Retention Model. The profile of those separated officers most closely
resembled the profile of those officers who were grouped as "leaving" by
their stated intentions. No conclusion or recommendation of the main
study was amended as a result of these validation study findings.
The culmination of this analytic study was the Retention Model's
representation of the junior officer as a decision maker. The three
career groups ("staying," "leaving," and "undecided") were characterized
by certain factors which were most significant in their decision making.
These findings, together with the knowledge of effects of proposed changes
provided by the Resource Allocation Model, were used to develop the recommen-
dations of this study. These recommendations were categorized as major
or minor. Each major recommendation would be expected to influence the
undecided officer toward an Army career, while each minor recommendation
would not on it's own influence an officer toward a career, but taken
cumulatively would be expected to exert a staying influence on the undeci-
ded officer.
___^~?A total of 44 study recommendations were subsequently approved by the
Secretary of the Army and have been implemented as Army policies [Ref. 15].
The majority of these recommendations involved actions involving assignment
of duties, career counseling, education programs, information programs for
Army wives, housing programs, and improvements in ROTC training. It
should be noted that the study presented no major recommendations calling
for increases in basic pay or retirement benefits. Therefore, none of the
accepted recommendations of the study required the expenditure of large
sums of money, nor did any of the programs require authorization from officials
outside of the Department of the Army.
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III. OFFICER GRADE STRUCTURE STUDIES
The purpose of this section is to investigate officer grade structures
and methods of improving upon current structures. We first discuss some
considerations as to what constitutes an optimal grade structure. Next,
the current structures are discussed; how they were established, what
legal restrictions are imposed on the structures of each of the armed
services, and how these structures change with changes in national or
Department of Defense policy. This section concludes with a review of a
recent study, the Officer Grade Structure Study
,
prepared by the Personnel
Studies Division, Directorate of Personnel Studies and Research, Office of
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army. The
study was published in March, 1969.
A. CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING AN OPTIMAL GRADE STRUCTURE
No single criterion exists for indicating when a structure is "optimal."
It might be expected that the relationship between the size of the total
officer force and the total armed force of a service is not linear.
Additionally, officer distribution by rank varies with the total officer
force size. Finally, each service requires a different grade structure
to accomplish its missions. Thus the form of an acceptable grade structure
may be different for the Navy, Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and the
structure for each service will change as the total size and mission of the
service change.
In the absence of a criterion for determining optimality, the services
have developed guidelines for acceptability and desirability to judge a
proposed grade structure. When using such guidelines, proposed new
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structures are judged on their acceptability or desirability relative to
the present structure. The problem of how to move from the present
structure to a proposed new structure plays a major role in evaluating
the new structure. For example, suppose the present Navy grade structure
contains 6500 Aviation Lieutenant Commanders, and a new structure is
proposed which requires only 5000 Aviation Lieutenant Commanders in the
near future. This new structure may have many advantages over the former,
but it has the undesirable feature of having an excess of 1500 officers
in the short run. These officers are in the middle of their careers,
have been trained at a considerable expense, and now have suddenly be-
come unneeded. This presents the Navy with a problem of sustaining an
effective and efficient fighting force while still providing adequate
career security to its officers. Transient problems of this sort must
be recognized and addressed when proposing changes in the officer grade
structure.
The following are guidelines of acceptability, or constraints, which
any proposed structure should satisfy. It should:
(1) Meet mission requirements in terms of officer strength both
in total and in each grade at each time period.
(2) Be an acceptable structure in the view of planners and
policy makers.
(3) Be acceptable to prospective members of the Officer Corps,
to attain the required retention by permitting service careers to be
attractive.
(4) Be sustainable through the planned time frame.
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(5) Be attainable from the current grade structure, allowing for
some acceptable time for transition and some level of disruption to
those presently in the structure.
(6) Conform to current laws and Department of Defense guidelines
in reaching prescribed limits within acceptable transition times.
Certain desirable features are also expected from a proposed officer
structure. These features can be looked upon as objectives of the pro-
posed structure, and include the following:
(1) The structure must provide qualified officers in sufficient
numbers to meet national objectives in time of war.
(2) It must be flexible enough to adjust to changing force levels
and short term policy changes.
(3) It must provide continuous intake of junior officers, and
provide for realistic retention rates.
(4) It must retain skilled career personnel and provide career
opportunities which realize the skills and experience developed by these
officers.
(5) It must allow an orderly promotion flow, following a predictable
pattern, for all age and grade groups.
(6) It must offer compensation through advancement which will
motivate the career officer and remain competitive at all stages of
advancement.
(7) It must provide quality control in promotion and separation of
officers.




Finally, a proposed structure should replace the present one only when
some significant advantage is clearly attainable.
These guidelines, in the forms of constraints and objectives, may
not be the only criteria for determining an optimal grade structure.
However, they do provide a means of judging any proposed structure
against the existing system. It should be recognized that some of the
guidelines may not always be consistent or compatible with each other,
and these inconsistencies will require compromise in proposed grade
structures.
B. CURRENT OFFICER GRADE STRUCTURES
Existing officer grade structures vary somewhat among each of the
armed services. For each service, the structure is divided into cells
containing the number of officers in each grade and then further divided
in accordance with each service's organization. For example, the Navy
Officer Corps is categorized by unrestricted line, restricted line, staff
corps, and limited .duty officers, while the Army Officer Corps is catego-
rized into five groups: Regular Army Career Officers, Other than Regular
Army (OTRA) Career Officers, Regular Army Junior Officers with less than
five years active federal commissioned service, OTRA officers with less
than five years active federal commissioned service, and Recalled or
Voluntary Active Duty Reservists.
Grade structures are then further broken down by branch or by
occupational designations (e.g. MOS). The type of breakdown varies from
service to service, just as the branch and MOS designations vary from
service to service. Some of these categories are arbitrarily established
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and manned by the service; however, the number of officers permitted by
major category and rank for each service has been established by legis-
lative action.
Overall service officer strength and rank distribution are basically
governed by the provisions of Title 10, U.S. Code (the Officer Personnel
Act of 1947 [Ref. 6]. This act provides ceilings on the total officer
strength, based on the enlisted strength of each service. The act also
prescribes a ceiling on the number of officers authorized within certain
ranks, as a function of the total officer strength. The distribution of
grades for the ranks of major (lieutenant commander) and above is control-
led by the Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954 (Public Law 83-349)
[Ref. 7]. The ceilings established by this law apply not only to the
number of officers in each grade, but also to the numbers in each branch
(for the Navy, separate ceilings are established for Line, Supply Corps,
Civil Engineer Corps, Medical Corps, Dental Corps, Medical Service Corps,
Nurse Corps, and Chaplain Corps). In practice, these ceilings are seldom
met, and in t.\e case of the Navy, the Secretary of the Navy has establish-
ed officer strengths at the level roughly 10% below these statutory
ceilings. The limits established in this manner are called "prescribed
ceiling."
Legislative constraints are also applied to promotion policies. The
Officer Personnel Act of 1947 provides the officer promotion machinery
for each of the armed services. Among other things, this act establishes
categories of officers for promotion purposes, and from these categories,
zones of promotion are established. These "promotion zones" are establish-
ed by the service secretaries prior to the convening of the appropriate
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promotion selection board. The size of the promotion zone is a function
of several factors such as (1) the number of vacancies expected to
exist in the next higher grade, (2) a rough approximation of the desired
promotion rate (percentage of officers in the promotion zone to actually
be selected for promotion) , and (3) the time in grade for an officer in
his present grade.
Promotion selection boards are not tightly bound to the approximate
promotion rate envisioned by the service secretaries; therefore, actual
promotion rates will vary somewhat from year to year. In addition to
considering officers in the promotion zone, the selection boards are
authorized under the statutes of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 to
select a certain percentage of the total number of officers to be promoted
from a "secondary" promotion zone. This zone is composed of officers
who are considered for promotion ahead of their contemporaries, as a
result of their previous outstanding performance.
The manner in which promotion zones are established varies among
the services. For example, the Navy and Marine Corps establish a pro-
motion zone, convene a selection board, and announce the selection of
officers for promotion in each grade on a fixed schedule each year.
However, the Army and Air Force convene selection boards and establish
promotion zones at irregular intervals (up to three-year intervals in
some cases). These boards are established when it appears that the service
will run out of officers who have been selected by the preceding selection
board for promotion to the next higher grade.
This discussion has pointed out the underlying reason for the exist-
ence and operation of selection boards, and for the variation in promotion
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selection rate from year to year. Selection is used administratively to
control promotions in accordance with the needs of the service, and as
authorized grade distribution will permit.
In the case of the Navy, legal constraints also establish a minimum
number of years in each grade and hence a minimum total commissioned
service before becoming eligible for promotion. Only the naval service
operates under these minimum times-in-grade constraints, and in some
cases these constraints have been suspended by executive order.
One final legislative constraint, as established by the Officer
Personnel Act of 1947 (and incorporated into Title 10, U.S. Code), acts
on the existing grade structure. This constraint concerns separation of
officers in the grades 0-1, 0-2, and 0-3 twice failing selection for
promotion to the next higher grade. These officers are separated from
the service. In the grades 0-4, 0-5, and 0-6, officers are guaranteed
a statutory retirement after a minimum of 20, 26, and 30 years, respec-
tively, without regard to failure of selection to the next higher grade.
All of the foregoing considerations in this section represent cons-
traints which have been established by law and which can be changed only
through further Congressional action. Therefore, these constraints are
generally considered to be fixed when conducting any analysis of changes
in officer grade structure resulting from introduction of new policies.
In proposing any new structure, new Congressional legislation would have
to be passed if such a structure exceeds the legal constraints presently
in existence. This could prove to be the most difficult step in imple-
menting a new officer grade structure.
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C. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, OFFICER GRADE STRUCTURE STUDY
This section presents a review of the Officer Grade Structure
Study [Ref. 5], prepared by the Personnel Studies Division, Directorate
of Personnel Studies and Research, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Personnel, Department of the Army. The study presents an investiga-
tion of the Army officer structure, and was published in March, 1969.
The overall classification of the study is SECRET, but only UNCLASSIFIED
portions are used in this paper.
The purpose of this study was to establish a sustainable officer
structure for the Army through 1975-1985. The general objectives of the
study were: [Ref. 5]
"(1) To develop an officer structure which will be capable of
providing, both in quantity and quality, the military leadership needed
by the Active Army to carry out its assigned missions from now through
1985.
(2) To develop an officer structure which will be career attractive
and sustainable regardless of officer strength fluctuations."
The specific objectives of the study were:
"(1) To determine officer requirements in terms of an officer
structure that will meet current and anticipated missions through 1985.
(2) To develop a practical means of adjusting to fluctuating force
levels, including a possible post-hostilities phasedown, concurrently
maintaining required quantitative and qualitative levels and acceptable
career development.
(3) To recommend improvements of policies and programs within the
personnel management functions which influence the officer structure.
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(4) To determine whether legislative changes or Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) program changes are required to attain and
support the officer structure developed in this study."
The study focused attention on Active Army officer requirements,
distribution of experience levels, sustainment capabilities at an accept-
able level of officer quality, and provisions for satisfying career prog-
ression for officers. The study did not investigate warrant officer
career management, branch and MOS assignments, and personnel readiness.
As an output, the study developed alternative officer baselines , using
guidance from the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) , Joint Strategic
Objectives Plan (JSOP) , Basic Army Strength Estimate (BASE), Army Force
Development Plan (AFDP) , Army 85 Concept Study, and T-day planning
guidance.
Before developing the actual grade structure, the study group
recognized that no criteria for an optimal structure exists, and thus
certain aspects of acceptability and desirability were investigated.
These aspects resemble those presented in Section IV "A" of this paper,
and they served as guidelines in judging the relative merits of the dif-
ferent proposed structures.
*A "baseline" is defined as "the Active Army end strength considered
to be the minimum required to meet normal peacetime missions; a relative-
ly stable end strength from which the Army can expand in the event of
hostilities or other national emergency and to which the Army would
contract upon resumption of normal peacetime conditions." [Ref. 5]
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The keystone to this study is the Officer Grade Structure Model
(OGSM) . This computer model incorporates both qualitative and quanti-
tative analysis and develops sustainable officer structures subject to
policy constraints and conditions. The OGSM considers officer strength
by grade, attrition rates, promotion rates, time in grade, and procure-
ment. It is supplemented with a mathematical model to specify the com-
putations required, and finally joined with a computer model to facili-
tate repetitive operations of the mathematical model.
The OGSM analyses three characteristics of the officer grade
structure; grade, time in grade, and active federal commissioned service.
The inputs (parameters) of the model are:
(1) Grade strength authorization.
(2) Promotion selection rates to the next higher grade.
(3) Time in grade for each grade (promotion points)
.
(4) Attrition rates for each grade, defined as losses other than
voluntary separations, resignations upon completion of initial two-year
obligated service, retirement at 20 years service, and voluntary separa-
tion after failure of promotion.
(5) If desired, the expected retention rates at two and twenty
years of service.
The outputs of the model are:
(1) A three-dimensional set of grade strength requirements, present-
ing the requirements by grade, time in service, and active federal com-
missioned service.
(2) Required procurement rates for second lieutenants.
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(3) Three-year, five-year, and ten-year retention rates which
will be required to sustain this structure.
(4) Two-year and twenty-year retention rates, if they were not
provided as inputs.
(5) The number of officers over or short of actual present officer
strength that is required to maintain the proposed structure.
Thus, in summary, the model calculates for each set of inputs the
requirements for sustainability of the structure, overages, underages by
grade, retention rates at different career points, and the necessary six-
month procurement rate of second lieutenants to sustain this proposed
structure.
The basis for the model is linear programming. In this type of
optimization problem, the grade strength authorization inputs are treated
as goals to be attained "as-closely-as-possible," given the promotion
points, promotion rates, and attrition rates. The problem is formulated
as follows:
Minimize: CX + DY + EZ (1)
Subject to: PX + Y - Z = B (2)
x. < x. ,, i=2, ... ,6 (3)
z. < .05b. , i=4,5,6 (4)
where
:
C = (ci, C2,...,c 6 ), D = (di, d 2 ,...,d 6 ), and E = (ei,e 2 , ,e 6 )
are vectors whose elements represent "cost" coefficients,
i = 1,2, ,6 (grade 0-1,0-2 ,... ,0-6) . Grades 0-1, 0-2, 0-3 are
company grade ranks; grades 0-4, 0-5, and 0-6 are field grade ranks,
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j = 1,2,...., 6 (periods of length of active federal commissioned service
(AFCS)), (j = 1 represents 0<AFCS<2, j = 2 represents 2<AFCS<3, j = 3
represents 3<AFCS<5, j = 4 represents 5<AFCS<10, j = 5 represents
10<AFCS<20, and j - 6 represents 20<AFCS) . See Figure 1.
X = (xi ,x 2 , . . . ,x 6 ) , where xi = steady state input of 2LT's per 6
month period, and x. (j = 2, 3,..., 6) = number of men in an input group
(cohort) who stay in the service until period "j."
Y = (yi >Y2 > • • • >y6) ; where y. is the underage in grade i.
Z = (zi ,Z2 , . . • ,ze) ; where z. is the overage in grade i.
P = (p..) is a 6x6 matrix where p.. is the average number of six
month periods spent in grade "i" by an officer with "j" periods of
service time
B = (bi ,b2 , . .
.
,be) ; where b. is the authorization for each grade i.
Thus, equation (1) represents the objective function, with the
objective of minimizing total "cost" of procuring and retaining the desired
officer structure while keeping costs of overages and underages low.
Equation (2) is simply an inventory equation, while equation (3) requires
decreasing cohort size in increasing time periods, and equation (4) re-
presents an additional constraint on the overages allowed for field grade
officers.
This problem is formulated in a somewhat different form in Appendices
I and II to Annex A of Reference 5, the Officer Grade Structure Study .
In Ref . 5, the constraints on overages of officers in field grades are
formulated, in contrast to equation (4), in such a way as to permit over-
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FIGURE 1. COHORT BEHAVIOR AS A FUNCTION OF TIME IN SERVICE
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grade. This overage of an overage seems to defeat the very purpose of
the constraint that has been applied.
The cost coefficients C, D, and E require further explanation. The
values assigned to each element are arbitrarily established by the planner
or policy maker operating the model, and should be thought of as relative
weights rather than costs. Their units are not mentioned in reference 5.
The coefficients actually used in the operation of the model were:
(c 1? c 2 ,
,c
6












) and (e^e^ ,e
6
> = 4.
These put relatively high weights on underages in field-grade ranks and
overages in all ranks. A change in these cost coefficients could create
a solution which differs considerably from that obtained using the above
values
.
The problem is solved using standard linear programming codes [Ref. 10]
The grade structure obtained is interpreted as the steady-state result of
procuring x
1
men in each time period and tracing their careers for an
entire 30-year period with given promotion points, promotion rates, and
attrition rates. Each period in service, across all grades, lists how this
group of x
1
men is distributed throughout the 30-year period, usually re-
ferred to as a "service distribution."
In addition to the cost coefficients, the parameters of promotion
selection rate and time in grade offer the primary means for controlling
the resulting structure. The structure was shown to be highly sensitive
to even minor adjustments in time in grade, and moderately sensitive to
adjustments in promotion rates. Sensitivity analysis of these two variables
can easily be conducted by the planner.
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Two points of criticism of the model are in order. First, there are
serious errors in the mathematical formulation. Appendix II to Annex A
of the Officer Grade Structure Study contains the basic mathematical deri-
vations used in developing values for the P(I,J) coefficients. Equation
(1) of this appendix states:
where a is the number of second lieutenants remaining at the end of
n &
their obligated tour of n six-month periods, X is the rate at which
second lieutenants are procured per six-month time period, and during the
period these second lieutenants are lost at a rate a (0 ^ a £ 1) per six-
month period. In fact, the equation for determining the number of second
lieutenants remaining at the end of their obligated tour should be:
a = X(l-a) n . (6)
n
For example, let n = 1 and let a = 1.0 (i.e. 100% attrition; all X
second lieutenants are lost). Equation (6) correctly shows that a =
at the end of that single period. However, equation (5), the one used in
Appendix II, shows that a = X/2 officers remain, even with 100% attri-
tion!
The second point of criticism is that no mention is made of duality.
The dual variables could be used to tell the relative prices of the con-
straints (overages, underages, etc.). Shadow prices could help the planner
or policy maker determine how binding each constraint is, and could be
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helpful in determining which of the constraints could be most profitably
changed in attempting to further minimize the objective function.
All of the conceptual and technical developments of this study group
lead to the use of the OGSM to develop structures to be recommended to the
Secretary of the Army for each of seven branch test strengths which might
conceivably be imposed on the Army in the next decade. These different
test strengths were obtained from various policy guidance decisions which
would affect the size of the Army in 1975-1985. Some 2500 runs of the
OGSM were made to arrive at structures which best satisfied these policy
directives and still met the criteria of acceptability and desirability.
The detailed picture of each of these seven structures was presented as
a separate, classified volume of this study report. For each of these
structures, the presentation included a detailed cell-by-cell and total
content of the structure recommended, distributed by categories of early,
normal, and late promotions in the grades second lieutenant through colonel,
and by amount of commissioned service within each grade. Additionally, the
report presented the specific promotion rates applicable to each officer
group within each grade, and the applicable retention rates for officers
in each group who were not selected for promotion.
The final area of analysis by the study group centered on a comparison
of the seven structures developed. The objective of this analysis was to
choose the most desirable structure, considering the prime factors of capa-
bility of expansion of each structure, readiness implications (i.e. main-
taining military preparedness) , and the impact on the Officer Corps during
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phasedown. Each of the seven structures was felt to be sustainable; there-
fore, based on the factors considered above, the largest of the seven
structures was deemed to be most preferred by the study group. The re-
commendations of the study group presented this finding, along with several
alternative baseline officer structures which would be recommended if policy
directives establishing smaller Army end strengths were implemented.
In summary, it is worthwhile to review the capabilities and limitations
of the Officer Grade Structure Model. The model attempts to:
(1) Design an officer grade structure with or without legislative,
force structure, or any other single constraint, which best satisfies the
Army's manning and readiness objectives.
(2) Determine weaknesses in existing promotion policies by demon-
strating their predicted long-term effects.
(3) Project problems which can be expected to occur over the long
term based on current promotion and retention rates, grade strengths,
times in grade, retirement rates, and constant input rates.
(4) Determine the approximate retention rates necessary for long
term sustainment of officer grade strengths.
(5) Display the "ideal" grade distribution by time in grade and
time in commissioned service for the Army and/or each branch.
Some of the model limitations are:
(1) The OGSM is a static model, and is valid only as long as present
policies and input data continue to apply. Change in management goals over
time are not taken into account. Since some of the policy inputs, such as
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end strength figures, attrition, and retention rates cannot be positively
controlled by the Army, the "ideal" structure requires repeated updating.
(2) The OGSM does not efficiently adjust to changing force levels,
because it is not able to provide for conversion from the present structure
to any new structure.
(3) The model only approximates promotion zones, since it specifies
time in grade and time-blocks in six-month intervals when in fact promotion
and attrition occur and can be regulated by the day. An obviously more
complex programming modification could overcome this minor limitation.
(4) The "ideal" or "optimal" structure generated by the model may
be neither ideal nor optimal, since it is simply a modification of the
present structure in accordance with certain rules assigning relative costs
to overages and underages in certain grades and then further analyzed in
light of certain rules for acceptability and desirability.
(5) Any results from the existing model are meaningless with the
errors present in the mathematical formulation. These could easily be
corrected.
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